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1Obstacles to Total Economic Integration in Regional Trade Blocs: The Case of Mercosur 
By: Jaissy Lorenzo 
 1. Introduction  
After several failed attempts of regional and economic integration among Latin 
American nations—exemplified by ineffective measures such as the Latin American Free 
Trade Association (1960), the Latin American Common Market (1965) and the current 
Latin American Integration Association (1979)—Mercosur was established as Latin 
America’s Southern Cone Common Market by the Asuncion Treaty of 1991. As a 
subregional common market, Mercosur sought to not merely reduce tariffs but also 
promote free trade and movement of capital and resources among its constituents: Brazil, 
Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, with Chile and Bolivia as associate members. 
However, as the European Union has so notably demonstrated, the long road leading to 
economic integration is filled with complexities and obstacles. In fact monetary 
unification among EU members has taken more than 25 years (Dorruci, Firpo, Fratzscher 
and Mongelli, 2002).  Yet although Mercosur should have expected challenges and 
growing pains similar to the EU, the lack of institutional and macroeconomic 
coordination among its members has hindered its primary goal to advance economic and 
monetary integration in the region, and therefore Mercosur’s over-arching success. 
This paper aims to explore the lack of institutional and macroeconomic 
coordination among Mercosur’s members and its effects on Mercosur’s primary goal to 
successfully achieve economic integration in the region. Using the framework presented 
by Dorruci, Firpo, Fratzscher and Mongelli (2002), who argue that this lack of 
coordination has been Mercosur’s most detrimental downfall, I will show how this lack 
2of institutional integration among Mercosur nations has inhibited further economic 
integration in this sector of Latin America. Dorruci, Firpo, Fratzscher and Mongelli 
(2002) sustain that in order for a regional trade bloc to achieve full economic integration 
it must first achieve institutional integration; that is, in order for a sustainable common 
market to be successfully implemented on an economic basis, there must be a set of joint 
policies that outline, support and enforce the economic objectives of the countries in 
question. Accordingly, institutional integration is defined “as the outcome of joint policy 
decisions designed to affect the depth and breadth of regional integration over time” 
(Dorruci, Firpo, Fratzscher and Mongelli, 2002) and exemplified through the five stages 
of regional integration among regional trade blocs developed by Balassa (1961): Free 
Trade Area (FTA), Customs Union (CU), Common Market (CM), Economic Union 
(EUN) and Total Economic Integration (TEI). Mercosur is currently classified as an 
imperfect customs union or an FTA setting up common tariffs and quotas (if any) for 
trade with non-members (Balassa, 1961).  
Furthermore, Dorruci, Firpo, Fratzscher and Mongelli (2002) measure the depth 
of economic integration in a regional trade bloc, based on the Optimal Currency Area 
Theory, according to the synchronization of the business cycle, convergence of inflation 
rates, exchange rate variability, trade openness and integration, convergence of interest 
rates, and income convergence between members of a regional trade bloc. We must 
address two significant caveats relative to these measures of economic integration. First, 
it should be discussed that “the integration process of real variables (business cycle, trade 
and income) is generally much slower than the integration process of nominal variables 
(exchange rates, inflation, interest rates, and financial markets)” (Dorruci, Firpo, 
3Fratzscher and Mongelli, 2002). That is, these variables must be analyzed with the 
knowledge that usually the nominal measures of economic integration will be stronger 
than the real variables according to the specific time period analyzed. Thus, the degree of 
economic integration in regional trade blocs is relatively quickly evident in nominal 
variables when compared to real variables. However, with respect to Mercosur, while the 
convergence of nominal variables since 1991 show significant increases in economic 
integration in the region, there is nevertheless much to be desired in regards to exchange 
rate, inflation and interest rate convergence, which will be actively discussed throughout 
the paper. Indeed the “correlation of nominal interest rates has been around 60% within 
the euro area during the pre-EMU period [when the EU was an imperfect customs union 
similar to Mercosur currently], but only around 30% for the Latin American countries” 
(Dorruci, Firpo, Fratzscher and Mongelli, 2002). 
 Secondly, there are various authors such as Busse, Hefeker and Koopman (2004), 
Larrain and Tavares (2003), and Belke and Gros (2002) who argue that the countries of 
Mercosur do not constitute an optimum currency area—thereby questioning the validity 
of applying the measures of economic integration to Mercosur—because “trade 
interdependence and intra-regional financial and labor market integration are low,” 
(Busse, Hefeker and Koopman, 2004) and member nations exhibit a high degree of both 
asymmetric shocks and exchange rate variability.  However, Dorruci, Firpo, Fratzscher 
and Mongelli (2002) explain that the endogeneity hypothesis—which states that 
monetary integration reduces trading costs much beyond the elimination of the costs 
arising from exchange rate variability— implies “that a group of countries adopting a 
single currency might develop into an OCA ex-post even if this group does not constitute 
4an OCA ex-ante”. In other words, although Mercosur as an imperfect customs union is 
not in a stage where it can successfully adopt a single currency for member nations and 
be deemed an OCA, because an OCA can develop after the implementation and 
coordination of macroeconomic policies, we can apply the concepts and ideals behind the 
OCA theory in our analysis of Mercosur. In essence, while Mercosur does not currently 
consistently exhibit the characteristics of an OCA, it can develop these characteristics 
over time through the enactment of the proper institutional and monetary policies.  
 Hence, with these definitions of both institutional and economic integration in 
mind, Dorruci, Firpo, Fratzscher and Mongelli’s (2002) main argument can be 
summarized as follows: institutional integration leads to deeper economic integration and 
economic integration further reinforces institutional integration in a circular fashion.  
Using the European Union as their comparative standard they propose:  
[t]he more institutional integration [goes] beyond the 
creation of a customs union and move[s] towards a 
common market and an economic and monetary union, the 
deeper economic integration turn[s] out. Increasing 
economic integration, in turn, corroborate[s] and sustain[s] 
the process of institutional integration (Dorruci, Firpo, 
Fratzscher and Mongelli, 2002).  
 
While scholars such as Barry Eichengreen (2004) claim that the Mercosur and EU 
comparison is not viable due to the unique political, historical and economic 
circumstances behind the development of both regional blocs, because the EU is the most 
successful common market which Mercosur implicitly seeks to emulate—Mercosur seeks 
to become a common market in Latin America similar to the EU—for the development of 
this paper the comparison is valid and concrete. Thus, in order for Mercosur to succeed in 
economically integrating this subregional common market, like the EU, it must seek to 
5achieve institutional integration through the coordination of macroeconomic policies 
among its members (i.e. coordinating monetary and exchange rate policies), and strong 
political commitments to the goals in question from the nations involved (i.e. creating 
laws and independent supranational governing institutions to enforce Mercosur 
objectives).  
 Accordingly, this paper will explore the specific obstacles that hinder Mercosur’s 
institutional and economic integration such as the differences in trade, exchange rate, 
price and inflationary policies, and the remaining tariffs and protectionist measures 
among member nations as result of lobbying interest groups (Baer, Cavalcanti and Silva, 
2001). These differences are detrimental to Mercosur’s success since Baer, Cavalcanti 
and Silva (2001) find these specific policies affect international trade and the allocation 
of investments among members of a trade area bloc. Furthermore, this paper will also 
discuss Mercosur’s lack of authority—since the Mercosur Treaty does not preside over 
national governments being intergovernmental and not supranational in nature—and its 
critical effects on the institutional and economic integration between Mercosur member 
nations.  Therefore, this paper will analyze the reasons behind the lack of institutional and 
economic integration in Mercosur, along with the unique economies and characteristics 
of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay and the formation of Mercosur.  
 
2. Mercosur Explained: A Brief Overview 
The international environment, specifically the combination of a series of forces 
including the computer revolution, advanced manufacturing technologies, and genetic 
engineering, paved the way for regional integration plans for Latin American countries 
that sought to achieve a “meaningful role in the international economic system” (Zerio, 
61992). Indeed Mercosur was based on the notion of “open regionalism” and neoliberal 
economic reform, which were designed not to only facilitate trade but also to “enhance 
the potential for countries to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), as a result of the lure 
of larger markets to Multinational corporations (MNCs) eager to take advantage of 
economies of scale” (Phillips, 2003). However, Mercosur was not solely created as a 
strategic response to the globalization processes imminent in the international 
environment, but also to promote the national capitalist project in the domestic political 
economy of member nations; it involved “the relocation of decision-making authority and 
a consequent contraction in space for discretionary government policy” (Phillips, 2003). 
More specifically, in a hemispheric environment controlled by the United States, the 
Mercosur alliance was a response against the U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere; 
Mercosur was also formed to resist and offset U.S. dominance (Phillips, 2003). In 
general, “regional integration was sought as a political tool to consolidate broader goals 
aimed at reversing the dark ages of authoritarianism, intraregional antagonism, economic 
crisis, and international marginalization” (Hirst, 1999).  
 However, many of these simplistic neoliberal assumptions concerning 
globalization and the formation of Mercosur are intricately complicated by the reasons 
behind each individual nation’s entrance into the Treaty of Asuncion. Kaltenthaler and 
Mora (2002) discuss how the primary motivation for regional integration in South 
America was Argentina and Brazil’s desire to end their century long trade and military 
rivalry and conflict, thereby dissolving the security dilemma and threat each nation 
presumed in one another. Indeed once an agreement was reached between the two 
nations—fostering a positive and non-threatening relationship—both nations, and the 
7regional bloc in general, aspired to strengthen democracy, democratic rule and the 
domestic economies of the region (Kaltenthaler and Mora, 2002). As a matter of fact, 
“Mercosur, like the European Community itself placed consolidating democracy and 
preserving peace in the Southern Cone among its paramount objectives” (Smith, 1993). 
 Besides promoting democracy, as the years progressed, for Argentina, Uruguay 
and Paraguay the motivation behind joining Mercosur and ensuring its success became 
economic gain—evident in Argentina’s desire to widen and expand Mercosur. On the 
other hand, Brazil consistently emphasized political interests and the need to strengthen 
civilian democratic interests over economic gain (Kaltenthaler and Mora, 2002). 
Furthermore, while the economic motive was prevalent in Argentina, Uruguay and 
Paraguay, there were still important dissimilarities in the reasons why each of these 
members sought to create a regional trade bloc and common market. On the one hand, 
while Argentina actively pursued its economic interests through Mercosur after the 
Brazilian conflict was resolved, for Paraguay in particular the democratic imperative 
reigned supreme. Paraguay’s primary and consistent motivation was the 
institutionalization of democracy; it sought “external support against persistent anti-
democratic forces threatening the fragile regime” (Kaltenthaler and Mora, 2002) after 
more than three decades of General Alfredo Stroessner’s authoritarian regime (1954-89).   
Both Paraguay and Uruguay also pose a special case for analysis since as the 
smaller Mercosur partners, they “did not join the integration process until after Argentina 
and Brazil agreed in July 1990 (Buenos Aires Act) to establish a common market by the 
end of 1994” (Kaltenthaler and Mora, 2002). Uruguay in particular was not interested in 
regional integration efforts with Brazil and Argentina because it feared being “absorbed 
8economically by the two subregional giants” (Bizzozero and Lujan, 1992). In 
consequence, the impetus behind Uruguay’s decision to join Mercosur was political in 
nature: President Luis Alberto Lacalle desired to “strengthen and enhance the power of 
the leadership on issues related to economic policy and integration” (Kaltenthaler and 
Mora, 2002).  President Luis Alberto Lacalle and former Uruguayan foreign minister, 
Hector Gros Espiell, wanted to avoid the potential economic costs associated with 
Uruguay’s lack of involvement in the Argentine-Brazilian integration (Kaltenthaler and 
Mora, 2002), especially since Argentina and Brazil were and remain Uruguay’s largest 
trade partners. Basically, Uruguay’s motivations “were largely of a domestic political and 
economic nature, initiated by political elites determined to achieve integration as a means 
of consolidating popular support for economic reform and democracy” (Kaltenthaler and 
Mora, 2002).   
While Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay played an active role in the integration 
process, Paraguay was more of a passive observer in the establishment of Mercosur. 
Precisely because it was a weak and newly established democracy itself, it lacked the 
power and ability to become an active participant in the integration process (Kaltenthaler 
and Mora, 2002). Thus, “the improvisation and immobilism of Paraguay’s foreign 
ministry and relative weakness and disorientation of political elites and societal groups 
(legacy of authoritarianism) contributed to Paraguay being ‘dragged’ by its neighbors 
(principally Uruguay) into the regional economic system” (Kaltenthaler and Mora, 2002). 
Accordingly, Paraguay had a minimal role, if any, in the long road leading to the Treaty 
of Asuncion. Consequently, due to the lack of knowledgeable experts on economic 
integration and negotiation in Paraguay’s foreign ministry, Uruguay defined and outlined 
9Paraguay’s interests in the process, although their interests and objectives did not always 
match (Simon, 1995; Mora, 2001). Conclusively, Paraguay’s primary reason for attaining 
membership in Mercosur was to advance democracy in its domestic politics.  Paraguay’s 
President Andres Rodriguez’s main foreign policy objective was to “re-insert Paraguay 
into the community of democratic nations” (Kaltenthaler and Mora, 2002). In essence, 
Mercosur offered Paraguay the opportunity to: 
(1) end Paraguay’s international isolation from which it 
suffered during the latter years of the Stroessner regime (2) 
reactivate a ravaged economy by joining regional economic 
integration systems and attracting foreign investments; and 
(3) perhaps the most important objective, seek international 
support for his government (Kaltenthaler and Mora, 2002). 
 
Mercosur provided an open door for the Paraguayan government to both legitimize its 
regime and re-introduce Paraguay into the democratic Latin American community for its 
advancement, growth and recovery from the Stroessner dictatorship.  As these diverse 
motivations behind Mercosur’s creation illustrate, Mercosur itself did not originate from 
economic or business sectors but from the governments or state elites who had their 
specific agendas and political inducements to create and join Mercosur (Kaltenthaler and 
Mora, 2002). 
 
2.1 Mercosur’s Main Provisions and Subsequent Successes and Failures 
With the process of integration beginning as early as 1985-1986 through the 
advent of the Program for Integration and Economic Cooperation (PICE) between Brazil 
and Argentina, Mercosur was created through the Treaty of Asuncion in1991— when 
Uruguay and Paraguay joined the agreement. Mercosur seeks to create a common market 
with a common industrial policy, thereby coordinating the economic policies of member 
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nations while simultaneously harmonizing competition policy, national investment 
regimes, and achieving a set of coordinated social policies dealing with security, drugs, 
the environment and democracy for example (Phillips, 2003). Thus, the Treaty, based 
upon concepts of deregulation and integration efforts, hopes to achieve “the free 
circulation of goods, services, and production factors, reinforced by the attainment of a 
uniform external tariff (Arrighi, 1992). From its inception, with a population of over 220 
million and a GDP in excess of USD 900 billion (Dorruci, Firpo, Fratzscher and 
Mongelli, 2002), Mercosur became the third largest trading bloc in the world after the 
European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA (Carranza, 
2003).  In fact, Mercosur became second to the European Union in terms of the depth of 
the integration process (Kaltenthaler and Mora, 2002). 
Successfully completing its transition phase from 1991-1994—wherein import 
tariffs between member nations were gradually eliminated—it was decided in the Buenos 
Aires presidential summit of 1994 that Mercosur would become an imperfect customs 
union, diverting the bloc from its over-arching goal of creating a common market 
according to Carranza (2003). However, it is significant to understand that this was 
actually a step toward its final objective as indicated by the five stages of regional 
integration discussed in Section 1. Indeed, signifying advancement and growth, the 
Mercosur Trade Commission was established by the Protocol of Ouro Preto of December 
1994, thereby creating an institution which administers trade relations between the 
members and serves as a forum of first instance for the settlement of trade disputes. Thus, 
the 1991 Free Trade Agreement—that entailed semi-annual, progressive, linear and 
automatic tariff reductions, lists of products temporarily excluded from such reductions, 
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to be reduced by the end of each of year, and the progressive elimination of non-tariff 
restrictions or equivalent measures (Dorruci, Firpo, Fratzscher and Mongelli, 2002)—
became an imperfect customs union through the implementation of a Common External 
Tariff on imports from third countries ranging from 0 to 20% in January 1995. However, 
there were a great number of exception lists in this CET for Mercosur members, which 
explains why Mercosur is deemed an imperfect customs union. These exceptions include 
up to 300 tariff items for Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay until 2001 and 399 items for 
Paraguay until 2006, reflecting that a convergence process is needed for the CET 
(Dorruci, Firpo, Fratzscher and Mongelli, 2002)—as of now, the time periods have been 
extended. As a sign of success however, intra-regional trade in aggregate Mercosur 
exports rose throughout the decade from 9% in 1990 to 25% in 1998 (Dorruci, Firpo, 
Fratzscher and Mongelli, 2002). Demonstrating the magnitude of this increase, Brazil 
accounted for one third of Argentina’s exports by the end of the 1990s, 40% of 
Paraguay’s exports and 35 % of Uruguay’s exports (Inter-American Development Bank, 
2000). It is also imperative to note that in 1996 Chile and Bolivia became associate 
members of Mercosur, which was an “important step in expanding Mercosur markets 
while moving in the direction of broadening regional integration” (Kaltenthaler and 
Mora, 2002). 
However, despite this success, due to the differing economic structures and 
political profiles of Mercosur members— the more industrial and diversified economic 
profile of Brazil (which also has a higher index of extra regional trade relative to the 
other Mercosur members) coexists with the agricultural specializations of Argentina, 
Paraguay and Uruguay (Phillips, 2003)—Mercosur has faced various challenges and 
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trade crises that have undermined its efforts in deepening both institutional and economic 
integration in the region. In fact, Mercosur’s largest economies, Brazil and Argentina, 
have differing and to a large extent conflicting political goals: Brazil favors the idea of 
‘deepening’ Mercosur while Argentina favors the “extension of the Mercosur and the 
construction of wider regionalist arrangements, reflecting its much greater relative 
dependence on regional markets” (Phillips, 2003). In essence, while Brazil desires to 
deepen the regional integration among Mercosur members, Argentina seeks to widen and 
increase Mercosur’s membership because it depends more heavily on trade in the South 
American region than Brazil. Due to the differing economic profiles and political goals 
for Mercosur among its constituents—evident also in the diverse motivations behind each 
nation’s entrance into the Mercosur Treaty discussed in Section 2—political tensions and 
fragility, exacerbated by the lack of supranational institutions in Mercosur, jeopardize its 
goal to harmonize economic policies and achieve a common market in the region. 
Basically, each member is pursuing the domestic and political agenda that is optimal for 
its domestic goals, while disregarding the effects these agendas inflict on Mercosur as a 
whole. This tendency to place the national goals and sovereignty over Mercosur 
objectives is explicitly exemplified in one of Mercosur’s major underlying problems: its 
lack of macroeconomic and exchange rate policy coordination (institutional integration), 
which is also directly measured through the exchange rate variability in the region—one 
of the nominal variables representing the depth of economic integration between 
members of a regional bloc. 
 
3. Macroeconomic and Exchange Rate Policy Coordination in Mercosur 
13
In order for Mercosur to be successful as both a regional trade bloc and potential 
common market, it must synchronize the macroeconomic policies of member nations, 
particularly those of Brazil and Argentina. As the largest and most powerful Mercosur 
economies, macroeconomic coordination between Brazil and Argentina is essential for 
Mercosur’s success as Latin America’s southern cone market. This is especially 
significant since Uruguay and Paraguay will implement monetary policies in line with 
these subregional giants to sustain positive trade relations with both nations and advance 
economic integration in the region—also evident in both Uruguay’s and Paraguay’s 
reasons for joining Mercosur mentioned in Section 2.  
Indeed coordinating macroeconomic policies is a prerequisite to sustain the 
“unhindered operation of market forces” (Zerio, 1992) in Mercosur. In fact,  
regional trade arrangements cannot flourish in the face of 
high levels of exchange rate and financial volatility. Sharp 
misalignments leading to import surges and distress for 
concentrated interests can provoke sharp reactions against 
liberalization, encouraging protectionist interventions that 
stymie regional integration (Eichengreen, 2004). 
 
The effects of these misalignments in macroeconomic and exchange rate policies on both 
trade relations and economic integration in Mercosur, are highly evident in two important 
crises: Brazil’s currency devaluation in 1999 and Argentina’s subsequent recession and 
devaluation in 2001-2002. These events (which will be discussed in the following 
section) have significantly hampered both institutional and economic integration in the 
region—thereby threatening Mercosur’s viability and existence—and exemplify the 
importance of synchronizing exchange rate policies between members of a regional trade 
bloc. Indeed, in comparison to the EU-6—which is the stage wherein the EU most 
resembled Mercosur’s current status and progress—real exchange rate variability in 
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Mercosur was almost 7 times higher, while nominal exchange rate variability was nearly 
10 times higher (Dorruci, Firpo, Fratzscher and Mongelli, 2002).   
However, before we can accurately analyze and understand the workings and 
effects of the afore mentioned crises, we must further explore the nature of the divergent 
monetary policies pursued by Argentina and Brazil. Specifically, throughout Mercosur’s 
progression both countries have operated under divergent exchange rate regimes and 
macroeconomic policies; Brazil has pursued a free-floating exchange rate regime while 
Argentina has followed a fixed exchange rate regime, pegging its peso to the U.S. dollar. 
Argentina’s exchange rate regime in the 1990s was sustained and implemented by the 
Convertibility Law and Plan of 1991, which explicitly pegged the peso one-to-one to the 
U.S. dollar—the Argentinean central bank could only issue new currency if backed by 
U.S. dollars (Carranza, 2003). Simultaneously, Argentina also implemented ‘far-
reaching’ economic goals in accordance to the Washington Consensus. The Washington 
Consensus is a very important agreement to understand since it also influenced Brazil’s 
macroeconomic policy, which simultaneously adhered to and challenged the main 
provisions of the Washington Consensus. Specifically: 
[t]he Washington Consensus favors full reliance on market 
forces to allocate resources. It features three main areas of 
economic policymaking: macroeconomic stability (“fiscal 
discipline”), a reduced government role in the economy 
(deregulation and privatization of state enterprises), and 
greater openness to the outside: elimination of barriers to 
trade while attracting foreign direct investment 
(Williamson, 1990). 
 
Thus, Brazil’s decision to adopt a floating exchange rate “while maintaining state support 
for domestic industry and a long-term industrial policy” (Carranza, 2003) both supports 
and undermines the Washington Consensus. It is no wonder that the striking differences 
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between Brazil’s free floating exchange rate regime and Argentina’s fixed exchange rate 
regime would hinder Mercosur’s goals of institutional and economic integration as a 
common market. Accordingly, Carranza (2003) explains: 
[i]ndividually, Brazil upheld an active industrial policy; but 
Argentina abandoned all state- sponsored industrial 
initiatives, partly for ideological reasons and for the fiscal 
restraints inherent in maintaining a fixed exchange rate. 
The simultaneous implementation of trade liberalization 
and opening of domestic financial markets made the four 
member states vulnerable to external crises, such as the 
Mexican “tequila” effect in 1995, without pursuing the 
minimum of “developmental protectionism” that would 
have allowed them to overcome technological obsolescence 
and become competitive in world markets. As Mercosur’s 
exchange rate problem became increasingly unmanageable, 
what emerged as Mercosur’s ‘common industrial policy’ 
was a set of ad hoc initiatives aimed at smoothing out the 
very erratic swings in the current account balance between 
Argentina and Brazil, especially given the two countries’ 
lack of progress in achieving macroeconomic coordination.  
 
Therefore, it is evident that the divergence between Argentina and Brazil’s 
macroeconomic policies has been detrimental to Mercosur, making the regional trade 
bloc vulnerable to external crises due to its lack of solid and sustainable common policies 
and unified objectives—which prevent Mercosur from institutionally advancing from an 
imperfect customs union to a common market. Indeed if Mercosur is practically 
struggling to survive under the pressures and crises created due to the conflicting policies 
of Argentina and Brazil, it cannot actively advance neither institutional nor economic 
integration in the region. Here, we can see the circular relationship between institutional 
and economic integration once more: because there is a high variability in exchange rates 
(lack of economic integration) between Mercosur’s two most powerful economies, the 
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regional trade bloc is unable to further integrate institutionally—and implement joint and 
harmonized fiscal and supra-governmental policies—into a common market. 
Similarly, Baer, Cavalcanti and Silva (2002) discuss how uncoordinated 
macroeconomic policies lead to excessive price and exchange rate fluctuations that affect 
international trade and the allocation of investments among members of a regional trade 
bloc. They specifically classify two main channels through which international trade is 
affected: 
[f]irst, there is an increased level of risk in international 
transactions (risk channel), which induce producers to 
refrain from exporting or importing and, therefore, causing 
an allocation of resources different than what would be 
suggested from comparative advantage. [Second] it also 
stimulates lobbying for protection from imports when there 
exists a substantial increase in the import penetration ratio 
(lobbying channel) (Baer, Cavalcanti and Silva, 2002). 
 
Thus, not only does the lack of macroeconomic coordination hinder institutional 
integration, but it also further inhibits economic integration as well, precisely because it 
distorts trade relations among Mercosur members by producing a framework that violates 
the theory of comparative advantage. Furthermore, these fluctuations in the real exchange 
rate “may increase or decrease the returns on investments and thus induce shifts in the 
location of new production plants and the reallocation of existing ones”  (Baer, 
Cavalcanti and Silva, 2002). This is particularly important for Mercosur nations since this 
reallocation of investments may cause strains between Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and 
Paraguay—because they heavily rely on foreign direct investment (FDI). Moreover, 
Argentina and Brazil’s divergent exchange rate policies have hampered commercial 
integration, which results in and reinforces “the formation of lobby groups demanding the 
introduction of trade barriers (when the level of import penetration increases) to protect 
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domestic industry from external competition” (Baer, Cavalcanti and Silva, 2002). Indeed 
the effects of lobbying further shift trade volumes as changes in import penetration ratios 
“increase the demand for protectionist measures in order to decrease the adjustment costs 
of the loss of competitiveness” (Baer, Cavalcanti and Silva, 2002).  
In essence, the uncoordinated macroeconomic policies between Mercosur’s 
Argentina and Brazil serve as obstacles to institutional and economic integration by 
hindering trade relationships (causing trade imbalances), increasing the prevalence and 
uprising of lobbying interest groups and protectionist measures in member nations, 
affecting the flows of FDI to member nations thereby increasing strains among them, 
intensifying the effects of external and internal currency crises, and hindering the pursuit 
of unified goals, objectives and policies that promote and advance Mercosur’s over-
arching goal to become Latin America’s southern cone common market. Here it is 
interesting to contrast that usually 
 regional integration, in general, reduces the impact of 
exchange rate volatility on trade (Bevilaqua, 1997) by 
implementing policies to promote macro coordination. One 
of the stated purposes of the EU, for instance, was to 
reduce exchange rate uncertainty and to avoid exchange 
rate misalignment among European countries to promote 
intra-trade and investments (Baer, Cavalcanti and Silva, 
2002). 
 
Thus, simply the mere fact that Argentina and Brazil have pursued such divergent 
exchange rate policies illustrates the persistent lack of institutional and economic 
integration in Mercosur, and the long and difficult road Mercosur countries must travel in 
order to successfully become a common market. 
 
4. Brazil’s Real Devaluation and the Argentinean Crisis Explained 
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As previously mentioned the detrimental effects of the uncoordinated macroeconomic 
policies of Argentina and Brazil on Mercosur are particularly exemplified through the 
effects of both the 1999 devaluation of the Real and the subsequent Argentinean crisis in 
the early 2000s. Beginning with the Brazilian devaluation, in 1999 Brazil was considered 
the latest victim of the global financial crisis that had broken out in Southeast Asia in July 
1997 and had spread to Russia in the summer of 1998 (Carranza, 2003). As a matter of 
fact, the crisis occurred in spite of a 41.5 billion economic support package announced by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Clinton administration in November 1998 
to prevent the ‘Asian flu’ from spreading to Latin America (Carranza, 2003). As Baer, 
Cavalcanti and Silva (2002) explain: 
[i]n January 1999 the Brazilian government had to 
terminate its policy of periodic small devaluations of the 
Real vis-à-vis the U.S. Dollar due to the accelerated loss of 
foreign reserves, resulting from a combination of capital 
outflows and trade deficits (Inter-American Development 
Bank, 2000). As result the Real was allowed to undergo a 
drastic devaluation of 40% vis-à-vis the U.S. Dollar, and 
hence the Argentinean Peso. 
 
This devaluation had several important effects on Brazil, Argentina and Mercosur. 
Firstly, it spurred an economic recession in both Brazil and Argentina, which reduced the 
amount of trade between both countries thereby jeopardizing economic integration in the 
region (Carranza, 2003)—in the first eight months of 1999, Argentine exports to Brazil 
were down 28.4 % from the comparable period in 1998; Brazilian exports to Argentina 
were down 26.9% (LAWR 1999c).  Thus, the devaluation devastated the Argentinean 
economy as Argentinean exports (particularly automobiles, steel, rice, and fruit) became 
less competitive on the Brazilian market—for example by August 1999, the giant auto 
plants in Argentina (such as Fiat) were operating at less than a quarter of their capacity 
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(Carranza, 2003). The devaluation “produced a much-feared ‘flood’ of cheap Brazilian 
imports to Argentina, from chickens to footwear” (Carranza, 2003). This led to 
implementation of protectionist measures from the Menem administration, which 
imposed a variety of restrictions on trade with Brazil such as a surcharge of US$410 per 
ton on imports of Brazilian iron, quotas for imports of five categories of Brazilian textile 
products, and prior licensing for imports of paper (LAWR 1999b).  
The Brazilian government in turn responded with similar countermeasures, such 
as a requirement of prior licenses for foodstuffs, boarder sanitary controls of Argentine 
products, and an import licensing system for industrial imports, which greatly hurt 
Argentina since 50% of Argentine exports to Brazil are manufactured goods (Carranza, 
2003). Therefore, while Brazil threatened to go to arbitration over Argentina’s 23% tariff 
on sugar and antidumping actions against Brazilian steel, Argentina, Uruguay and 
Paraguay were complaining over the newly implemented trade restrictions. This was 
especially serious because Argentina sells 30% of all of its exports to Brazil and 35% and 
over 40% of Uruguayan and Paraguayan exports, respectively, go to Brazil (Carranza, 
2003). The crisis escalated to such a degree that Brazil threatened to dissolve Mercosur 
unless Argentina removed some of its tariffs. Fortunately, however, both countries were 
able to solve the disputes through the help of the industrial associations of both countries 
who set limits on mutually protectionist measures (Carranza, 2003). 
 However, while these issues were temporarily resolved, due to Argentina’s fixed 
exchange rate regime and its lack of an independent monetary policy, it continued to 
suffer as a result of its overvalued peso. As Carranza (2003) describes, Argentina’s fixed 
exchange rate regime “was a big obstacle to achieving macroeconomic harmonization in 
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Mercosur”. In fact, the overvaluation of Argentina’s real exchange rate and the 
devaluation of the Real in 1999, negatively impacted Argentina’s automotive sector as 
they “caused both a switch in components purchases to Brazil and also a migration of 
FDI to the latter due to lower costs of production” (Baer, Cavalcanti and Silva, 2001)—
thereby increasing tensions between the two countries. Specifically, as a result of the 
Brazilian devaluation and Argentina’s over valued peso, Chrysler closed its plant in 
Cordoba and GM closed one of its Argentinean plants thereby concentrating its 
remaining production in Rosario (another Argentinean city) (Baer, Cavalcanti and Silva, 
2001). Thus, Argentinean executives feared that the parent offices of multinationals 
would continue to transfer operations to Brazil, where production costs were 25 to 30% 
lower than in Argentina—especially since no new investment plans were made in the 
Argentinean automotive sector in the subsequent years following the Real’s 1999 
devaluation (Baer, Cavalcanti and Silva, 2001). 
 In general, by March 2001, Argentina’s economy was on the verge of collapse, 
while the Brazilian economy entered its own recession. Furthermore, with the scarce 
ability to meet its debt payments, the Argentinean recession grew worse when Brazil 
once again devalued its currency by 32% in the first quarter of 2001. This economic crisis 
motivated another set of trade disputes as Argentina raised a tariff of 35% on imports of 
consumer goods from outside Mercosur, and eliminated tariffs on imports of capital 
goods from outside the bloc to encourage domestic investment (Carranza, 2003). These 
measures—supported by Mercosur’s Common Market Council through December 31, 
2002—clearly violated Mercosur’s common external tariff, causing a temporary 
suspension of the customs union, once again threatening Mercosur’s existence.  
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Consequently, a reduction in bilateral trade between both nations followed once more as 
a result of these protectionist measures —Argentinean exports to Brazil in September 
2001 fell 26.7% ($447 million) from September 2000, while imports of Brazilian 
products fell 39.2% ($330 million) in the same period (Business and Information 
Community 2001). Further complicating the tensions between Argentina and Brazil, 
Domingo Cavallo—author of the Convertibility Plan, came to power on March 20, 2001, 
appointed by President De La Rua, as Argentina’s economy minter. Cavallo undeniably 
preferred a trade agreement with the U.S. instead of completing the customs union 
precisely because Brazil did not want to dollarize its currency.  
Therefore, due to Brazil’s periodic devaluations and the negative impact on the 
Argentinean economy, political and economic tensions were high between Mercosur’s 
most powerful economies. Yet after a meeting of the Common Market Council on 
October 8, 2001—following an informal Cardoso-de la Rua (the presidents of Brazil and 
Argentina during that period) summit—the disputes were resolved. Argentina and Brazil 
agreed to “create a ‘temporary bilateral mechanism of safeguards inspired by the rules of 
the World Trade Organization’ allowing Argentina to compensate Argentine industries 
by imposing temporary tariffs on any products that it could show to have been affected 
by a surge in imports caused by the Brazilian currency’s fall” (Carranza, 2003). Though 
this served as a temporary solution to the trade disputes, the economic pressures of the 
overvalued peso were so high that in December 2001 Argentina’s currency board 
collapsed and the peso was devalued in January 2002. As Eichengreen (2004) points out: 
[i]n Argentina, convertibility was regarded as a sacred 
contract between the government and the public and the 
linchpin of national economic policy, but when it came to 
be seen as incompatible with the pursuit of full 
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employment and growth, it lost public support and then 
investor confidence. 
 
Indeed, the Argentinean devaluation shows the difficulty in defending exchange rate 
bands or pegs in the face of highly liquid international financial markets (Eichengreen, 
2004). 
 As these crises illustrate, it was precisely the lack of macroeconomic policy 
coordination that led to the profound conflicts among all four Mercosur nations and 
threatened Mercosur’s existence. Exhibiting the detailed characteristics and effects of 
uncoordinated macroeconomic policies detailed in Section 3, we can clearly observe how 
these crises exacerbated and emphasized the lack of both institutional and economic 
integration in the region. By constantly questioning and making exceptions to the 
customs union, the regional bloc’s institutional integration was persistently undermined 
along with its economic integration, as illustrated by the reduction in bilateral trade 
between Argentina and Brazil during these crises. As Carranza (2003) concludes: 
Argentina and Brazil have managed to iron out their trade 
disputes while upholding Mercosur as a ‘strategic project’. 
Yet what is left of a customs union when member states 
can establish so many temporary exceptions to the common 
external tariff? 
 
Furthermore, as Carranza (2003) explicitly discusses, these temporary resolutions 
were—as is customary for Mercosur—accomplished through presidential diplomacy. The 
presidential summits paved the way for reconciliation between the foreign and finance 
ministers of Brazil and Argentina, thereby ensuring Mercosur’s survival. The following 
section will briefly discuss the power of presidential diplomacy in Mercosur’s creation 
and survival.   
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5. Presidential Diplomacy in Mercosur 
Presidential power and diplomacy have played a significant role in Mercosur’s 
creation and survival in the face of various threatening critical crises exemplified in 
Section 4.  Simultaneously hindering and promoting Mercosur’s progress to become a 
common market, presidential diplomacy and involvement are consistently highlighted 
throughout Mercosur’s most historically detrimental and significant moments. 
Specifically, through Malamud’s (2005) detailed discussion of how the meetings between 
Argentinean and Brazilian presidents Menem and Cardoso respectively, were the impetus 
behind the temporary resolution adopted between Brazil and Argentina—after the 
Brazilian devaluation in 1999 threatened Mercosur’s existence—we can see the important 
role presidents serve in Mercosur. In this respect, presidents employ the tasks that usually 
correspond to foreign ministers, chief executives, and supranational institutions—if they 
existed in the regional trade bloc. In fact, Malamud (2005) explicitly discusses how the 
final-dispute-settlement mechanism in Mercosur conflicts is inter-presidential bargaining. 
However, Malamud (2005) also consistently emphasizes that “presidential 
interventions were successful because they were backed by institutional capabilities such 
as veto and decree powers and because the presidents were not accountable to the 
legislative branch”. In other words, because the presidents of Brazil, Argentinean, 
Uruguay and Paraguay were capable of exercising their political will and power freely—
for the benefit of Mercosur—due to the institutions in their national governments, 
Mercosur survived and surpassed its most detrimental moments. Indeed in order to solve 
the Argentinean-Brazilian crisis after the devaluation of the Real: 
Menem affirmed his supremacy vis-à-vis the cabinet and 
the diplomatic corps. Under his personal supervision, his 
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right-hand man had gone above the heads of politicians and 
bureaucrats to arrange a meeting with the Brazilian 
president, one that incidentally also contravened the public 
position of the Brazilian foreign minister. Thereafter, the 
presidents settled the dispute alone (Malamud, 2005). 
 
Furthermore, as explored in Section 2, it was the presidents of Brazil, Argentina, 
Uruguay and Paraguay that spurred the creation of Mercosur and their respective nations’ 
involvement in the regional trade bloc and the Treaty of Asuncion. As Malamud (2005) 
describes, “Mercosur arose from the political will of national governments, and only 
thereafter generated public demand for further integration.” As a result, Mercosur 
presidents have acquired the popular legitimacy and determination to intervene in 
Mercosur issues in order to promote regional integration in the southern cone. 
Specifically: 
[w]hile increasing interdependence has created the need to 
manage a growing number of crises and coordination 
problems in Mercosur, transactors seem to demand 
particular decisions rather than general rules. For such a 
task, by and large, national presidents have been perceived 
as more able—more accessible, more responsive, more 
effective, faster—than any other actors to reach decisions 
(Malamud, 2005). 
 
By delegating such power and influence on Mercosur to the national presidents, it is 
obvious that Mercosur presidents are sovereign as policy-crafters and decision-makers—
presiding over both Mercosur as an institution itself and any other regional institutions 
that might be created to support Mercosur and further integration in the region. 
According to Malamud (2005) Mercosur presidents have been successful as chief 
executives and decision makers of the bloc because: 
the constitutional capabilities of the presidents vis-à-vis 
other actors have made it credible that their polices would 
not be blocked, [and secondly] the preeminence of the 
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presidents has provided social actors with a single, non-
bureaucratic target through which to channel their interests, 
allowing for a faster decision-making process. 
 
Consequently, presidential intervention in Mercosur conflicts and activities “has become 
a structural element of the integration process” (Malamud, 2005). Indeed as critical actors 
in the integration process, oftentimes presidents were even able to compromise national 
sovereignty without facing serious vetoes from other relevant actors for two reasons. 
Firstly, “a high degree of concentration of power in the hands of the chief executives 
enabled them to overcome or circumvent potential veto players” (Cheibub and Limongi 
2002; Figueiredo and Limongi 2000; Malamud 2001). Secondly, “foreign policy typically 
offers chief executives more room to maneuver than domestic politics do (Rogowski 
1999; Schlesinger 1974, Silva, 1989). 
Precisely because presidents have played such a crucial role in Mercosur negotiations 
from its inception, it is no wonder that they are “also reluctant to build up regional 
institutions or to relinquish their competencies to the regional institutions that do exist” 
(Malamud, 2005). This unwillingness to create regional institutions for Mercosur further 
illustrates and explains not only the lack of macroeconomic and fiscal policy coordination 
in the region, but also the lack of supranational governing institutions that would help 
advance economic and institutional integration. Certainly, while presidents have 
advanced integration in Mercosur by refusing to give up their sovereignty, they have also 
hindered the process—exemplified in the lack of effective supranational institutions in 
Mercosur and the lack of appeals to the institutions, such as the Protocol of Brasilia, 
already in place (Malamud, 2005). Indeed as Kaltenthaler and Mora (2002) proclaim: 
[r]ather, loose regulations and shallow institutionalism have 
been maintained at a relatively low political cost. The 
26
trepidation of political elites is due to their unwillingness to 
cede any domestic policy autonomy that a harmonization of 
macroeconomic policy and supranational institutions would 
produce. 
 
In this case, we see the real objective political elites and national presidents sought 
through regional integration; they sought to “strengthen the power and authority of elites 
and their fragile states that faced significant domestic political and economic challenges” 
(Kaltenthaler and Mora, 2002). Thus, societal and state elites will continue to hamper the 
integration process—by impeding the coordination of macro and fiscal policies and 
obstructing the creation of supranational institutions—for fear of losing their autonomy 
and power to Mercosur. 
Basically, Mercosur nations and presidents seek to obtain the benefits of both worlds: 
“the member states of Mercosur want the maximum economic and political benefits from 
integration while foregoing as little sovereignty as possible” (Kaltenthaler and Mora, 
2002). Conclusively, Mercosur’s strong reliance and dependence on presidential 
diplomacy as a final dispute settlement mechanism reflects the fear member nations 
experience from the possibility of losing national autonomy and sovereignty to Mercosur. 
However, this fear inhibits the integration process among Mercosur’s members as Zerio 
(1992) accurately portrays:  
The stark reality is that as long as the integration effort 
rests solely on the initiative of presidents and a few 
ministries, Mercosur’s success will be linked too directly to 
the fortunes and misfortunes of the individual 
administration that is attempting to implement the process.  
 
This further explains why over a decade later, Mercosur has yet to achieve total economic 
and institutional integration among its constituents. As previously mentioned, this precise 
desire to have the best of both worlds is a primary reason why Mercosur lacks 
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supranational institutions that would further advance both institutional and economic 
integration in the region, which will be explored in greater depth in the following section.  
 
6. Mercosur’s Deficiency: The Lack of Supranational Institutions 
Mercosur’s lack of supranational institutions is another one of the main reasons—
besides the lack of synchronized macroeconomic and fiscal policies among member 
nations—that Mercosur has failed to fully achieve its common market status. 
Historically, whereas the Europeans created supranational institutions to avoid the threat 
of declaring war against one another, Mercosur nations, specifically Brazil and 
Argentina, overcame their security dilemma—discussed in Section 2—without the need 
nor desire to surrender their sovereignty to supranational institutions (Kaltenthaler and 
Mora, 2002). Accordingly, as detailed in Section 5, Mercosur has relied on presidential 
diplomacy to stay afloat during its most difficult times instead of relying on supranational 
institutions to effectively solve disputes between member nations and advance regional 
integration. Part of the reasons for this phenomenon, also discussed in Section 5, is the 
desire of political and states elites to retain and consolidate their autonomy and power. 
These conflicting interests—Mercosur members seek to advance institutional and 
economic integration while retaining individual power—serve as significant obstacles to 
the creation of a ‘mini-Maastricht’, in European terms, and supranational institutions. 
 However, these supranational institutions are necessary to advance both economic 
and institutional integration in the region. Indeed the differences between member nations 
and their divergent and uncoordinated macroeconomic policies are exacerbated by the 
lack of supranational decision-making authority, “which necessitates the transfer of 
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legislation entirely to the national level” (Phillips, 2003). As Mercosur lacks these 
institutions to enforce a code of set standards and regulations to further integration 
between Mercosur members, it is no wonder that laws pertaining to Mercosur must be 
enforced and created at the individual national levels. Undoubtingly, this inspires 
conflicting and divergent perspectives, laws, and polices between member nations that 
lack the capability to coordinate and enforce their laws without supranational institutions. 
Precisely because the Treaty of Asuncion is intergovernmental in nature, not 
supranational, “Mercosur’s decisions have no force as such and need to be implemented 
by corresponding national measures, with no obligation for member states to comply with 
common market rules” (Dorruci, Firpo, Fratzscher and Mongelli, 2002). There is indeed 
no supranational court through which “either a member country or the Mercosur 
Secretariat can enforce treaty provisions on another member or a private party” (Dorruci, 
Firpo, Fratzscher and Mongelli, 2002). The lack of an institution, similar to the European 
Commission, that would serve to hold Mercosur members accountable to Mercosur laws 
and policies prevents the convergence of interests, fiscal and economic policies between 
Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay (Arrighi, 1992; Eichengreen, 2004). Thus, any 
possible solutions to the uncoordinated macroeconomic polices of Mercosur nations will 
be greatly undermined due to the lack of a supranational body to preside over Mercosur. 
Furthermore, the actual institutions created by the Treaty of Asuncion are also 
“intergovernmental organs where decisions are made by consensus” (Kaltenthaler and 
Mora, 2002). Specifically: 
[t]he Common Market Council (CMC) is composed of 
ministers of foreign affairs and economy; it is the highest-
ranking body, responsible for political direction. 
[Furthermore] in December 1994, the Joint Parliamentary 
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Commission made up of legislators from the member 
countries and the Advisory Forum on Economic and Social 
Matters were created. Neither body has the power or 
capacity to make decisions; they only have responsibility 
for monitoring and making recommendations (Kaltenthaler 
and Mora, 2002). 
 
Evidently, these institutions themselves lack decision-making and coordinating power 
thereby sustaining the decision-making powers of the presidents and foreign economic 
ministers in Mercosur. Indeed the lack of supranational institutions exacerbates 
Mercosur’s complicated arbitration process—implemented when the Common Market 
Group cannot solve the dispute in question. In fact, since private companies cannot get 
involved in Mercosur trade disputes, when they have a complaint against a member state, 
they can only resort to the national agency of the concerned 
regional organ, such as the National Section of the 
Common Market Group and the Mercosur Trade 
Commission (MTC). Should they wish to move further to 
the arbitral phase, they need the support of their own 
state…  (Haines-Ferrari 1998, 275) 
 
Therefore, in order to successfully achieve economic and institutional integration in the 
region, Mercosur must create supranational institutions to support the regional trade bloc 
and imperfect customs union. 
 
7. Possible Solutions to Diverging Macroeconomic Policies 
Various scholars have proposed diverse solutions to solve Mercosur’s problems 
arising from the lack of macroeconomic policy coordination among its four members. 
Some, specifically Busse, Hefeker and Koopmann (2004) have incorporated their 
understanding of the prevalence of fixed exchange rate regimes in Latin American 
nations into their solutions. Evident in various examples ranging from El Salvador’s full 
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dollarization regime to Argentina’s Convertibility Plan, it is significant to discuss these 
nations’ preference for fixed exchange rate regimes over free floating regimes. One, if 
not, the most significant reason for this tendency and preference is that fixed exchange 
rate regimes lead to more stable exchange rates. On the other hand, free floating regimes 
imply, encourage and produce a higher degree of exchange rate variability, thereby 
leading to risk and adverse economic effects on foreign investment and trade between 
significant external trade partners for the region—such as the United States and the 
European Union. Accordingly, “stable exchange rates are also important for the 
sustainability of deep integration as the vulnerability of trade and investment flows to 
exchange rate movements grows in line with rising interdependence among partner 
countries” (Busse, Hefeker and Koopmann, 2004). Consequently, one can conclude that 
stable exchange rates are known to foster healthier and more prosperous relationships 
among and between trade partners. It would follow then that achieving a stable exchange 
rate through diverse degrees of dollarization, as evident in Argentina’s case, would favor 
trade relations with the U.S.  
Latin American nations such as Argentina have also leaned towards a stable or 
fixed exchange rate regime in order to “import monetary stability” (Busse, Hefeker and 
Koopmann, 2004). That is, by pegging their currencies to a more established and credible 
currency such as the U.S. Dollar, these countries hope to increase the credibility of their 
own currency and monetary policy in order to avoid higher expected inflation and interest 
rates—caused by a lack of credibility in a country’s monetary policy (Busse, Hefeker and 
Koopmann, 2004). However, though there is some validity to this theory “today it is 
often stressed that fixed rates provide a natural target for speculators whereas flexible 
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rates, at least under (nearly) full capital mobility, appear less inviting to speculators” 
(Busse, Hefeker and Koopmann, 2004). Thus, though fixed rate regimes may seem 
appealing, especially since “capital inflows to emerging markets are typically 
denominated in foreign currencies” (Busse, Hefeker and Koopmann, 2004)—most long-
term debt in these nations has been issued in U.S. dollar or euro terms— the threat of 
speculation may undermine the very purposes and goals of monetary and exchange rate 
stability these nations are seeking. These ideals explain the motivations behind 
Argentina’s Convertibility Plan and the subsequent devaluation of the Argentinean peso 
after the currency board collapse in December 2001. 
 In fact, according to Busse, Hefeker and Koopmann (2004) because Mercosur 
nations are greatly dependent and linked to both the U.S. dollar and the euro—
demonstrating the ill approach of the Convertibility Plan which only considered the U.S. 
as Argentina’s principal trading partner—Mercosur should implement a dual currency 
board that “could at the same time provide a stabilizing anchor to domestic policy, be 
credible, and solve the problem that trading patterns do not accommodate a single 
currency peg to either the dollar or the euro”. Busse, Hefeker and Koopmann (2004) 
propose that such a dual currency board could further contribute to the stabilization of 
exchange rates within Mercosur. In this sense, a dual currency will both favor trade 
relations and agreements between Mercosur and its two largest trading partners, and 
contribute to further economic integration between Mercosur members. Indeed the 
benefits of a dual currency board are highlighted through the significant figures that 
demonstrate Mercosur’s deep trade relations with Europe and the U.S.: nearly 50% of the 
region’s total trade is with the EU, with regard to Mercosur’s own total trade (including 
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internal trade) nearly one-fourth of its trade is with the EU and one-fifth of its overall 
trade is with the U.S., the U.S. being its second largest trading partner (Busse, Hefeker 
and Koopmann, 2004).  Thus, a dual currency board would lend higher credibility and 
promote further regional integration in Mercosur since the currency board 
should be less vulnerable to exchange rate movements 
between the currencies of main trading partners, i.e. the 
dollar-euro rate, than a standard currency board [and] it 
should restrict exchange rate movements between the 
members of Mercosur to a significant degree” (Busse, 
Hefeker and Koopmann, 2004). 
 
Furthermore, because both major international currencies will be considered, there will 
be no problems with financial flows (Busse, Hefeker and Koopmann, 2004) thereby 
making a strong case for the dual currency board. 
Whereas Busse, Hefeker and Koopmann (2004) advocate a dual currency board, 
Malamud and Label (2002) argue for the implementation of the Merco as a common 
currency for Mercosur. Malamud and Label (2002) support the idea of “a floating 
currency that leaves room for independent monetary policy and wage and price 
flexibility”, while maintaining monetary discipline.  Malamud and Label (2002) discuss 
how “a flexible rate regime averts the currency crisis that besets target zone and crawling 
peg arrangements”—i.e. the Argentinean crisis. Presenting, a path for total monetary 
union in the region, Malamud and Label (2002) propose, “when managed by an 
independent central bank committed to holding down inflation, this alternative affords the 
stability advantages of dollarazation.”  In addition, they argue that as a floating currency, 
the Merco’s flexibility vis-à-vis other currencies provides a cushion against external 
shocks, a cushion that dollarization lacks. Malamud and Label (2002) also discuss 
additional advantages of the Merco, which will also serve to secure seignorage 
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revenues—purchasing power that a government secures by creating money at essentially 
no cost that it can use to buy real things—for the members of the Merco zone. However, 
realizing that the Merco cannot be instituted overnight, Malamud and Label (2002) also 
describe a process similar to Busse, Hefeker and Koopmann (2004) whereby: 
Argentina would tie its peso to a shrinking basket of dollars 
and euros while Brazil retains an inflation targeting—
floating exchange rate regime with an inflation target 
somewhat above the U.S.—euro zone average. With the 
peso tied by formula to the dollar and the euro and the real 
linked more loosely to these currencies, narrow spreads 
between Argentine and Brazilian inflation rates and interest 
rates should maintain over time. Brazil would adjust its 
inflation target to achieve convergence with Argentina 
before a common currency is inaugurated. The suggested 
path offers Argentina an exit strategy from its current hard 
fix to the dollar. Other Merco zone candidates could follow 
similar paths as Argentina (Malamud and Label, 2002). 
 
Thus, both models, the dual currency board and the Merco, reflect the importance of 
achieving some form of reconciliation between the Euro and the U.S. dollar necessary to 
stabilize the high exchange rate variability in Mercosur. Indeed as Zerio (1992) 
foreshadows: “unless the economies of Argentina and Brazil succeed in controlling 
inflation, and put in place monetary policies that maintain a certain level of currency 
parity, integration is unlikely to be successful”. 
 On the other hand, rejecting monetary union in the region while simultaneously 
favoring the synchronization of macroeconomic policies between Mercosur members, 
Barry Eichengreen (2004) advocates a common policy of inflation targeting for Mercosur 
members. Arguing that it is not likely for Mercosur countries to forego their individual 
sovereignty through the adoption of a single currency, such as the Merco proposed by 
Malamud and Label (2002), he argues that the best alternative for Mercosur nations is 
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harmonized inflation targeting.  Barry Eichengreen (2004) contends that inflation 
targeting would “reduce exchange rate volatility to levels more compatible with the 
operation of their free trade areas, but would not require ambitious commitments to 
coordinate policies that, at the end of the day, cannot be successfully met”. Thus, 
Mercosur nations would be able to solve the problems resulting from unsynchronized 
macroeconomic policies while both retaining their national sovereignties, and employing 
reachable goals and objectives regarding both institutional and economic integration in 
the region. In essence, through harmonized inflation targeting, Mercosur nations will 
resolve the problems dealing with exchange rate instability while reconciling monetary 
autonomy with economic integration. Furthermore, discrediting the basket-peg or dual 
currency board approach endorsed by Busse, Hefeker and Koopmann (2004), 
Eichengreen (2004) sustains that, as the Argentinean case exemplifies: 
If there is one clear lesson in international financial history, 
it is that so-called adjustable pegs grow rigid in an 
environment of high capital mobility. That rigidity, in turn, 
limits the scope for foreign support. And with absent 
foreign support, the defensibility of such pegs is dubious. 
 
Thus, Eichengreen (2004) argues that instead of promoting institutional and economic 
integration in Mercosur, such an approach would undermine regional integration in its 
entirety. The main provisions of inflation targeting are: 
an institutionalized commitment to price stability as the 
primary goal of monetary policy; mechanisms rendering 
the central bank accountable for attaining its monetary 
policy goals; the public announcement of targets for 
inflation; and a policy of communicating to the public and 
the markets the rationale for the decisions taken by the 
central bank (Eichengreen, 2004). 
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In summary, as a policy framework, “inflation targeting is designed to provide a clear 
and credible anchor for monetary policy that stabilizes both expectations and foreign 
exchange markets themselves” (Eichengreen, 2004) 
However, while these three viable solutions for Mercosur’s unsynchronized 
macroeconomic policies have great validity, it is nevertheless important to note that the 
fiscal policies of these nations must also be coordinated—and institutional integration 
enhanced in the regional trade bloc—in order for such frameworks to produce their 
desired effects. Specifically in terms of the three solutions, all authors respectively 
mention and discuss the importance of institutional and fiscal integration: Firstly, Busse, 
Hefeker and Koopmann (2004) discuss: 
It is clear, however, that a dual currency board cannot solve 
[all] of a country’s macroeconomic problems. A currency 
board alone does not force politicians, as the Argentine 
example demonstrated, to run prudent fiscal policy. It does 
not avoid that countries run up debts that are ultimately not 
consistent with a fixed exchange rate, and it does not solve 
the free-rider problems of fiscal federalism. Hence, 
currency boards will only survive if these problems can be 
solved. 
 
Similarly, Malamud and Label (2002) also proclaim: 
Following the euro zone’s example, cross currency 
exchange rates should be stabilized and inflation rates, 
interest rates, and government debt to GDP ratios should 
converge before a common currency is instituted. Uniform 
financial regulations must also be designed and a credible 
commitment to low inflation must be demonstrated. 
 
Accordingly, Eichengreen agrees that Mercosur countries: 
[m]ust follow prudent fiscal and financial policies, not just 
adopting appropriately balanced budgets but also 
minimizing their dependence on short-term, foreign 
currency-denominated and indexed debt. With such 
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policies in place, exchange rate volatility can be reduced to 
levels compatible with regional integration. 
 
As demonstrated in the preceding statements and as supported by Dorruci, Firpo, 
Fratzscher and Mongelli (2002), in order to achieve economic integration through 
macroeconomic policy harmonization, Mercosur members must advance institutional 
integration through the synchronization of fiscal policies in order to further promote 
regional integration among Mercosur’s constituents—again showing the circular 
relationship between institutional and economic integration. 
 
8. Conclusion 
This paper has shown the intricate and inter-related reasons and obstacles that prevent 
Mercosur from successfully implementing a common market in Latin America’s southern 
cone. Discussing the historical and diverse motivations for Mercosur’s creation from the 
perspective of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, along with the inherent 
differences in their economic profiles, we can clearly observe some of the fundamental 
reasons why Mercosur has been unable to achieve total economic integration among its 
constituents similar to the European Union. By using the framework provided by Dorruci, 
Firpo, Fratzscher and Mongelli (2002), this paper has demonstrated that Mercosur cannot 
achieve its goal of total economic integration in the region unless it makes the efforts to 
achieve institutional integration through the coordination of currently divergent 
macroeconomic and monetary polices, and the implementation of a successful common 
market through the creation of supranational institutions. In fact, unless Mercosur nations 
take the necessary measures to reduce the role of presidential diplomacy during Mercosur 
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crises, implement supranational institutions, and coordinate fiscal policies among its 
members (institutional integration), the solutions discussed in Section 7 will be 
ineffective and incapable of resolving Mercosur’s uncoordinated macroeconomic 
policies—thereby hindering the region’s economic integration. Yet as Dorruci, Firpo, 
Fratzscher and Mongelli (2002) discuss, in order for institutional integration to further 
advance in the region it must be supported by economic integration, which has been 
deterred as a result of the lack of institutional integration in the first place—evident in the 
Brazilian and Argentinean economic crises wherein the lack of macro coordination 
hindered economic integration. 
 However, Mercosur has made substantial process in these issues as well. During a 
Mercosur summit on December 15, 2000 a Macroeconomic Monitoring Group (GMM) 
was established to monitor the compliance of member nations to a set of macroeconomic 
convergence targets endorsed by Mercosur (Eichengreen, 2004). Indeed, currently all 
Mercosur nations have adopted a free floating exchange rate regime. Furthermore, the 
implementation and creation of the Protocol of Olivos for Dispute Settlement, signed by 
the presidents of the bloc’s member countries on February 18, 2002, also shows signs of 
advancement for institutional integration in the region. Through this agreement, a 
permanent tribunal, made up of 5 arbitrators, was created to review the awards issued by 
ad hoc arbitration tribunals. This tribunal’s awards are considered ‘final judgment’ and 
‘will be binding on the state parties involved in the dispute’ (INTAL 2002, 7; Carranza 
2003). In essence, while Mercosur has the power to become irreversible if it continues on 
the right path towards achieving full economic and institutional integration, if it fails to 
overcome and resolve the obstacles that impede these processes, “the Mercosur customs 
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union risks becoming an empty shell, even if it remains politically important as an 
instrument to negotiate free trade agreements with European Union and the United 
States” (Carranza, 2003). 
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